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There  has  been  a  time  when  ‘industrial  policies’,  for  both  developed  and  developing 
countries, were bad words not to be spoken either in public or in private by respectable people. It 
was  the  time  of  the  (in)famous  ‘Washington  Consensus’  on  development  –  dominant  among 
international policy makers in the last part of the 20
th century – with its market fundamentalism, 
made of an invariant recipe good for all macro diseases (less government, fiscal sweat and tears, 
privatizations, etc.) in turn grounded into a very naïve and blackboxed microeconomics (‘… the 
market will take care of itself … hence do not mess around with micro behaviors …’). At last, the 
realization  of  the  impressive  failures  of  the  recipe  (see,  revealingly,  World  Bank  (2005)  and 
(2008a)) has finally sobered up a significant share of both economists and policy makers (although 
with significant exceptions in both camps).  Indeed, at the time this book is sent to the publisher, the 
tsunami hitting the  world financial markets is hammering bitter  reason  even  amongst the most 
stubborn  believers  in  the  miraculous  properties  of  ‘markets’  as  they  exist  only  in  economic 
textbooks. 
This book, however, is not about beating the dead horse – notwithstanding the many horses 
still  running  around  –  and  concerns  only  tangentially  the  so-called  ‘augmented  Washington 
Consensus’, that is the revisitation of the former one with a much greater emphasis on ancillary 
institutions. Rather, this book is about industrial policies seen as intrinsic fundamental ingredients 
of  all  development  processes:  witness  to  that,  every  experience  of  successful  industrialization, 
ranging from Germany and the USA, almost two centuries ago, all the way to Korea, Taiwan, 
Brazil, China and India nowadays. 
The  notion  of  ‘industrial  policy’  is  understood  here  in  a  quite  expansive  manner.  It 
comprises  policies  affecting  ‘infant  industry’  support  of  various  kinds,  but  also  trade  policies, 
science and technology policies, public procurement, policies affecting foreign direct investments, 
intellectual  property  rights,  and  the  allocation  of  financial  resources.  Industrial  policies,  in  this 
broad sense, come together with processes of ‘institutional engineering’ shaping the very nature of 
the  economic  actors,  the  market  mechanisms  and  rules  under  which  they  operate,  and  the 
boundaries between what is governed by market interactions, and what is not. 
 
 
The accumulation of capabilities in the great industrial transformation 
 
The contributions to this book analyze from different angles the role played by industrial 
policies, in the foregoing broad sense, and by institution building within that great transformation – 
borrowing Karl Polanyi (1944) expression – leading from traditional, mostly rural, economies to 
economies  driven  by  industrial  activities  (and  nowadays  also  advanced  services),  able  to 
systematically learn how to implement and eventually how to generate new ways of producing and 
new products under conditions of dynamic increasing returns. 
Such a ‘great transformation’ entails a major process of accumulation of knowledge and 
capabilities, both at the levels of individuals and organizations. Certainly, part of such capabilities 
builds on education and formally acquired skills (what in the economists’ jargon often goes under 
the heading of ‘human capital’). However, at least equally important, capabilities have to do with 
the  problem-solving  knowledge  embodied  in  organizations  –  concerning  e.g.  production 
technologies, marketing, labor relations as well as ‘dynamic capabilities’ of search and learning. 
Many  contributions  to  this  volume  can  be  read  in  this  perspective,  which  links  with  a 
growing literature on technology, innovation and development (see, among others, Amsden (2001), 
Bell and Pavitt (1993), Chang (2002), Chang and Cheema (2002), Cimoli and Dosi (1995), Dosi, 
Pavitt and Soete (1990), Mytelka (2007), Nelson (1982 and 2004), Reinert (2007)). More precisely, 
many of the chapters which follow tackle the impact of various forms of policy intervention upon 
the rates and directions of knowledge accumulation during the catch-up process and the ensuing 
effects upon the patterns of production and trade.   3 
 
The inter-technological and intersectoral diversity of opportunities 
 
That  sectors  and  products  matter  in  terms  of  learning  opportunities  is  increasingly 
recognized well beyond the ‘structuralists’, Kaldorian and evolutionary camps where the conjecture 
was originally put forward (that is from Prebisch (1950), Kaldor (1981), Dosi, Pavitt and Soete 
(1990), to Hausmann and Klinger (2006), and Hausmann and Rodrick (2006)). The basic intuition 
is that specific technologies and specific sectors and products matter because they entail different 
learning  opportunities  and  also  different  income  elasticities  of  demand.  Thus,  today’s 
specializations  influence  tomorrow’s  productivity  growth,  chances  to  innovate  and  demand 
potential: we elaborate a bit on the point in the chapter by Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson and Stiglitz and 
dwell on it in Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990). If this is the case, however, ‘industrial policies are a 
predicament’ - as Hausmann and Rodrick (2006) put it - because countries inevitably have the 
choice  of  steering  their  future  paths  of  capability  accumulation,  and  together  their  patterns  of 
production and trade. Even the choice of not having any (implicit or explicit) industrial policy is a 
choice in itself, i.e. the acceptance of the current international division of intellectual and physical 
labor, and with that the current distribution of learning opportunities. 
 
 
Ricardo vs List 
 
On the issue – as we are reminded in the chapter by Reinert below (see also Reinert (2007)) 
– there is a divide, which can be traced back to the very origin of modern political economy, 
between a view prescribing on normative grounds the acquiescence in the ‘revealed comparative 
advantages’ one country inherit from its past, and an alternative view traceable back even beyond 
Hamilton and List, arguing that the ‘productive forces’ of a nation can and must be purposefully 
constructed,  and  that  current  comparative  advantages  are  a  luxury  that  only  technological  and 
market leaders can afford (indeed a major asset that they can exploit). 
It  happens  that  quite  a  few  of  the  contributors  to  this  volume  bear  to  varying  degrees 
sympathy with this latter view and show – we believe quite convincingly – how a wide array of 
policies and institutions have been behind the earlier catch-up successes of e.g. Korea and Taiwan 
and more recently of e.g. China and India. 
 
 
Knowledge and Business Organizations 
 
We have already mentioned that the accumulation of knowledge and capabilities does entail, 
but is not exhausted by, the upgrading of the skills of workers and technicians. Needless to say, 
such educational efforts are of paramount importance. And so is the construction of broader social 
capabilities in the sense of Sen (1985).   However, there is a fundamental organizational dimension 
in such a process, as the whole body of literature from business economics inspired by capability-
based theories of the firm has begun to reveal (for an overview, Dosi, Marengo and Faillo (2008)). 
It  is  not  only  or  not  even  primarily  an  issue  of  entrepreneurship.  In  fact,  contrary  to  common 
wisdom,  lack  of  the  latter  might  not  be  a  peculiarity  of  underdevelopment:  on  the  contrary, 
imaginative  entrepreneurial  efforts  of  economic  survival  under  hardship,  and  even  the  level  of 
entrepreneurial  sophistication  of  Sicilian  Mafia  or  the  Medellin  Cartel,  witness  that 
‘entrepreneurship’  as  such  might  not  be  a  widespread  bottleneck  for  development.  Rather,  the 
bottleneck  is  likely  to  concern  much  more  some  persistent  ‘inability  to  seize  opportunities’, 
paraphrasing Albert Hirschman, regarding the productive manipulation of knowledge, especially 
when  such  manipulation  have  a  complex  collective  dimension,  involving  also  the  intra-
organizational coordination of several actors carrying diverse pieces of knowledge and most often   4 
diverse interests (on seemingly ‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘intrapreneurship’ within incumbent firms, 
see, below the Hobday and Perini chapter).  
Indeed,  organization  building  is  one  of  the  most  different  tasks  facing  developmental 
industrial policies. The idea that a Toyota, a Samsung, a Tata, an Embraer can just naturally spring 
up out of a multitude of peasants, just due, again, to the ‘magic of the market’, is a fairy tale that 
few ought to be ready to believe. In fact, the characteristics of the producers in the catching-up 
process , their organizational sophistication, and also their nationality (whether domestic or foreign) 
matters a lot in terms of learning patterns (see Amsden’s chapter, below). 
 
 
Technological learning: a primus inter pares, not a magic bullet 
 
We have been arguing that the changes in the patterns of accumulation and processing of 
information  and  knowledge  is  at  the  core  of  development  patterns:  the  ‘unbound  Prometheus’ 
systematically improving technological and organizational knowledge is a crucial deus ex machina 
of  early  industrialization  almost  three  centuries  ago,  and  also  of  subsequent  episodes  of 
development (Landes (1969) and Cipolla (1965), cf. also Landes (1999), Freeman (1982), Reinert 
(2007), Rosenberg (1976), Mokyr (1990) and Nelson (2005)). However this is far from being the 
identification  of  some  ‘magic  bullet’.  In  fact,  economic  historians  investigating  the  ‘European 
exceptionalism’ (Landes (1999)) leading to the industrial revolution do point at the advances of 
technical  knowledge  as  a  crucial  factor  in  the  industrial  take-off.  However,  the  European 
industrialization precisely illustrates that not even technological advances are such a ‘magic bullet’. 
Many  of the technological advances upon  which the industrial  revolution drew were originally 
developed, or at least equally known, in other regions, in primis China. ‘European exceptionalism’ 
was  made  possible  by  a  conjunction  of  complementary  conditions  ranging  from  the  ‘scientific 
attitude’ of inquiry about nature which fostered knowledge accumulation and its codification and 
diffusion, all the way to the characteristics of the political structure and the relations between rulers 
and subjects.  In this vein, C. Freeman ((2008), which puts together an  ensemble of his classic 
contributions) suggests that national systems of innovation and production develop and advance (or 
do  not)  on  the  grounds  of  the  co-evolutionary  dynamics  among  five  sub-domains,  and  related 
institutions, governing   5 
 
(i)  the generation of scientific knowledge (he is talking primarily of ‘frontier’ countries); 
(ii)  the  development,  improvement,  adoption  of  new  artifacts  and  new  techniques  of 
production (that is the domain of technology); 
(iii)  the economic machine  which organizes the production and distribution of  goods, 
services  and  incomes,  and  together,  information  flows  and  patterns  of  incentives 
amongst economic agents;  
(iv)  the political and legal structure; 
and, finally 





Several  scholars  are  indeed  adding  substance  (implicitly  or  explicitly)  to  this  ‘grand  political 
economy’  program:  we  have  already  mentioned  few  contributors  to  the  technology-focused 
literature, but the ‘ground view’ takes on board the complementary importance of the political 
economy of labor relations, income claims, property rights, and indeed, of culture (working our way 
backward, from Mokyr (2009)), North (2005), and Greif (2006), all the way to Karl Marx and 
Adam Smith). 
This is not the place to discuss in any detail the long history of industrialization in general. 
Suffice to say that if there is some truth in this co-evolutionary story, such truth does not apply only 
to the Low Countries four centuries ago or England three centuries back. It does apply equally well 
to all the much later episodes of industrialization and subsequent self-sustained growth. The point is 
indirectly  revealed  by  the  overall  shaky  results  stemming  from  the  quest  for  overarching 
institutional preconditions for growth or invariant policy recipes for it
1. On the contrary, the co-
evolutionary account rests on the sorts of congruence conditions between ingredients (including 
state  variables  which  influence  the  subsequent  dynamics)  and  processes  wherein  feature 
prominently the matchings or mismatchings between capabilities accumulation and the institutions 
governing  the  distribution  of  information  and  the  incentive  structures  of  any  one  economy.  
(Incidentally,  note  that  if  this  view  is  correct,  the  outcomes  of  different  combinatorics  among 
institutional  set-ups  and  learning  dynamics,  is  not  likely  to  be  statistically  captured  by  heroic 
‘reduced  form’  estimations  in  quest  for  some  pre-conditions,  or  driving  factors  of  differential 
growth - supposedly shielded from endogeneity - invariant in their effects across countries). 
For sake of an illustration, consider the diagnostics of the underlying drivers of different 
performances of East Asia and Latin America in the ’80s and ‘90s dramatized in Table 1.1 (drawing 
upon Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani (1994) and Freeman (2008) where one can find more detailed 
discussions). Notably such diagnostics of the significantly different economic outcomes, highlights 
primarily diverging processes at both microeconomic level (e.g. the different modes and intensity of 
technological search), and at a more aggregate one (e.g. the patterns of investments in ICT); and, 
together,  diverging  institutional  set-ups  (affecting  education,  income  distribution,  corporate 
learning, etc.). As we argue in the chapter that follows by Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson and Stiglitz, policies 
and  various  measures  of  ‘institutional  engineering’  have  deeply  shaped  the  patterns  of  growth 
throughout contemporary industrial history dynamics. In fact, many of the subsequent chapters add 
to our understanding of how policies and institution-building have shaped both the accumulation of 
technological and organizational capabilities and the political economy in which it is embedded. 
                                                 
1 Sachs and Warner (1997) is a known short example of the genre; more specifically on the role of institutions and 
policies within the ‘new political economy’ style of interpretation, cf. the somewhat diverging views of Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001), Easterly and Levin (2003), Rodrick (2008). For a sharp critique of mono-causal 
explanation of underdevelopment, see Adelman (2001), together with a few other contributions to Meier and Stiglitz 
(2001).   6 
 
Table 1.1 At the roots of different East Asian and Latin American Performances: 
divergences in National Systems of Innovation and Production in the 1980’s and 1990’s 
 
East Asia  Latin America 
Expanding education system with high proportion of 
engineering studies 
Deteriorating education system with proportionally 
lower output of engineers 
Rapid growth of scientific and technical activities at 
enterprise level, especially R&D 
Slow growth stagnation or decline of enterprise 
level R&D and other learning activities 
Progressive integration of production design, 
marketing and research activities within the firm 
Weakening of R&D and absence or decline of 
enterprise marketing (especially on foreign 
markets) 
Development of strong science-technology 
infrastructure 
Weakening of science-technology infrastructure 
Strong influence of Japanese models of 
management and networking organization 
Continuing influence of outdated management 
models 
High levels of investment  Generally lower level of investment 
Heavy investment in advanced telecommunications  Slow development of modern telecommunication 
Strong and fast-growing electronic industries with 
high exports 
Weak electronic industries with low exports 
More generally, patterns of specialization favoring 
goods with high income elasticities 
Specialization in low income elasticity goods 
Growing participation in international technology 
networks and agreements 
Low level of international networking in technology 
Rather sophisticated policy efforts aimed at 
fostering technological learning and generalizing 
rent-seeking even under regimes of protection of 
domestic markets (until the 80s) 
From generalized protection with little anti-rent 
seeking safeguards to ‘wild market regimes’ with 
little learning incentives 
Relative egalitarian income distribution  Very unequal income distribution- and increasingly 
so - 
Source: elaborations on Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani (1994) and C. Freeman (2008) 
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Taking  a  centennial  perspective,  Reinert  identifies  a  kind  of  invariance  in  the  inspiring 
principle for successful catching-up policies, namely a philosophy of emulation vis-à-vis world 
technological  leaders,  irrespectively  of  revealed  comparative  advantages.  (More  on  that  in  the 
conclusions to this book). This applies to pre-industrial revolution England; 19
th century Germany 
form the Zollverein onward; the United States since their constitution; Japan, starting from the Meji 
restoration well into the second half of the 20
th century; post WWII Korea; and also the policy 
antecedents  of  current  successes  of  China  and  India.  On  the  latter,  see  the  (on  the  purpose 
controversial) chapters below by Singh and by Dahlman.  
An historical topography of policy experiences is in Di Maio’s contribution, while W. Peres 
traces the somewhat shy comeback of industrial policies – ridden of implementation hurdles – in 
Latin America after the apotheosis of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (and the experience of its failed 
promises).   
Some chapters reconstruct the role of both macroeconomic and industrial policies along the 
history of a country’s development: see Castro on Brazil, Kosakoff and Ramos on Argentina and 
Singh on India.   
Other  contributions  explicitly  compare  different  countries  or  groups  of  them  in  their 
performances  and  try  to  identify  the  role  of  policies  underlying  the  different  patterns  of 
specialization and growth: see Palma on the comparison East Asia vs. Latin America and Dahlman 
on a comparative assessment of both policies and outcomes of India and China. 
Another group of contributions addresses, so to speak horizontally, specific policy domains.  
So, Akyuz revisits the importance of trade policies for local industrial development and assesses the 
consequences of the newly introduced constraints in their use stemming from the WTO regime of 
international exchanges.  But even granted ‘infant industry protection’ (something that indeed is not 
granted any longer), what are the organizational loci where learning occurs and how does their 
nature affect knowledge accumulation? 
 
 
Entrepreneurship, incumbent organizations and development 
 
Hobday  and  Perini  analyze  the  role  of  entrepreneurship  in  the  development  process, 
dispelling also the myth of a diffused entrepreneurial potential for industrial development hidden in 
marginality and compressed by bureaucracy and red tape.  As we already mentioned, developed 
capitalist  economies  have  no  monopoly  for  entrepreneurial  efforts.    A  distinguished  feature  of 
industrial  economies,  however,  is  that  a  significant  share  of  such  efforts  is  devoted  to  the 
manipulation  and  improvement  of  products,  production  technologies  and  the  development  and 
maintenance of organizations able to implement them.  This is the type of  entrepreneurial and 
managerial abilities required by the great transformation.  And indeed, as Amsden’s chapter argues, 
most often the accumulation of technological and managerial capabilities has historically occurred 
within domestic firms rather than within subsidiaries of foreign owned firms.  One of the reasons 
for  this  phenomenon  (which  is  not  going  to  disappear:  see  also  the  remarks  in  the  chapter  by 
Castaldi,  Cimoli,  Correa,  Dosi)  is  that  even  when  MNCs  are  an  important  source  of  capital 
investment, they often carry a relatively limited technology transfer, with the most tacit forms of 
knowledge and a good deal of R&D activities being kept in developed countries (indeed, often near 
the corporate headquarters).  One could say that MNCs tend to bring in higher ‘static capabilities’ 
but also often entail greater obstacles for local ‘dynamic’ learning capabilities.
2 
                                                 
2 Are these patterns going to persist also under the current ‘globalized regime’ of production?  In fact the evidence 
suggests a significant increase in the internationalization of R&D activities (cf. the evidence critically reviewed in 
Narula and Zanfei (2005)).  However such patters involve primarily intra OECD-investments. While the question is 
certainly open, we tend to believe that the weakness of the incentives, if any, to purposefully transfer major ‘dynamic 
capabilities’ of innovative search to newly industrializing countries – including China – is likely to persist also in the 
future.   8 
 
 
Institutions supporting the great transformation 
 
We  have  repeatedly  emphasized  knowledge  accumulation  as  central  process  within  any 
industrialization strategy, occurring to a good extent but not exclusively within business firms.  As 
the chapter by Mazzoleni and Nelson shows, the process – when it occurs effectively – is supported 
and nurtured by the activities of applied research, training, consultancy, adaptation of technologies 
to local conditions undertaken by universities and public laboratories. 
Technological learning, of course, does not happen in the thin air, but rather goes hand in 
hand  with  investments  in  physical  equipment  and  intangibles.    And,  in  turn,  that  requires  the 
mobilization of financial resources and their transfer to industry.  By now the economic profession 
is well aware of the implications of the fundamental informational asymmetries underlying industry 
financing, being it via credit or via equity (cf. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)).  This applies in general, 
and even more to industrializing countries.  How did earlier industrializers cope with them, and 
what may that experience teach to current catching-up countries?  The question is addressed in the 
chapter  by  Colin  Mayer  drawing  upon  the  early  history  of  industrialization  of  England  and 
Germany.  In the literature, one often emphasizes the difference between a supposedly market-
based (and equity-based) English system and a credit-based German one.  The chapter argues that 
the differences were less pronounced than it appears at a first glance,  even if the two systems 
differed in the ways equities were intermediated.  In fact, the crucial point – entailing also a major 
normative lesson for ‘institutional engineering’ in developing countries – concerns the development 
of institutional arrangements fostering relations of trust in equity intermediation (incidentally, note 
also that, notwithstanding ‘globalization’, these relations are bound to have an intrinsically ‘local’, 
possibly national, or even regional, dimension). 
 
 
The appropriability of knowledge and the opportunities for imitation 
 
Technological learning throughout the catching-up process, and especially in its early phase, 
involves a lot of imitation, reverse engineering, marginal modifications of products and processes, 
and straightforward copying (the point has finally come through also the official discourse of some 
international organizations: see World Bank (2008) and ECLAC (2008)).  It has been so in the past 
in England vis-à-vis the Netherlands, in the U.S. vis-à-vis England, in Japan vis-à-vis the developed 
West and it is so nowadays in the case of China. 
However,  the  possibility  of  successfully  undertaking  such  activities  of  imitation  in  the 
broadest sense depends, first, on the absorptive capabilities of the various countries (cf. Cohen and 
Levinthal  (2008)  who  write    about  firms,  but  the  notion  can  be  easily  extended  to  countries 
composing  inter-related  ensemble  of  firms  and  complementary  organizations).    Absorptive 
capabilities  fundamentally  concern  the  ways  in  which  past  achievements  in  knowledge 
accumulation influence the future learning potential (and, as such they impinge also on the degrees 
of path-dependency that the process of capability-building displays).  
Second,  given  whatever  absorptive  capabilities,  the  easiness  of  imitation  is  modulated  by  the 
degrees of appropriability of the various technologies – by which we mean a measure of the ability 
of the originators/owners of the process and product technologies to keep to themselves the relevant 
underlying  knowledge  and/or  the  ensuing  claims  to  the  economic  benefits  coming  from  the 
exploitation of such knowledge.  It happens that quite often appropriability conditions depend to a 
large extent on the nature of technological and production knowledge itself (cf. Dosi, Marengo and 
Pasquali (2006) and the literature cited therein).  Imitating a Boeing or an Airbus is likely to be hard 
in itself irrespectively of the legal conditions of knowledge appropriation, while the latter might 
affect  a  lot  the  possibility  of  reproducing  a  new  chemical  entity.    However,  appropriability   9 
conditions are also affected by the regimes of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).  Clearly, other 
things  being  equal,  tighter  IPR  regimes  imply  harder  conditions  for  imitation.    The  issue  is 
discussed in the chapter by Cimoli, Coriat and Primi.  Historically, imitative activities by catching-
up countries have occurred under quite lax conditions regarding the international enforcement of 
IPR especially with regard to at-the-time developing countries.  So, for example, until the mid-
nineteenth century the United States were not recognizing patents to non-nationals and the pro-
domestic  bias  continued  long  after.    Germany  and  Japan  originally  allowed  ‘utility  patents’, 
covering also minor improvements over state-of-the-art technologies most often protecting local 
‘creative imitators’.  In fields like pharmaceuticals – indeed the technological area where IPR count 
most – countries like Italy and Switzerland (the headquarters of some major drugs multinationals!) 
recognized IPR altogether only around three decades ago.  Things have dramatically changed since, 
with the current scene featuring both TRIPS international agreements and an unexpected novel 
aggressiveness of U.S. and European companies in their IPR protection even against seemingly 
marginal  infringements  and  even  at  the  cost  of  world  moral  outrage,  like  in  the  case  of  anti-
retroviral drugs.  Does all this change the imitation opportunities of catching-up countries?  If so, 
generally, or only in some technologies?  While this book is not focused primarily on this issue
3, the 
evidence  discussed  in  Cimoli,  Coriat  and  Primi’s  chapter  seems  to  suggest  that  a  tighter  IPR 
enforcement  regime  has  effects  on  the  imitation/catching-up  process  that  range  between  the 
irrelevant and the quite harmful: certainly, the positive sign is hardly to be seen on the screen. 
 
 
Incentives and rents in the political economy of learning 
 
The reader will have already noticed that the thread of our argument rests more on notions 
such as knowledge, information, capabilities, learning rather than incentives.  This is also what 
distinguishes this line of interpretation of development processes from another one inspired by the 
principle of ‘getting the incentives right and everything will follow’.  The thrust of our argument is 
that,  given  whatever  incentives,  ‘learning  how  to  seize  technological  and  organizational 
opportunities’  is  a  fundamental  driver  of  industrialization.    Granted  that,  however,  the  two 
dimensions are far from orthogonal.   
As discussed in detail in the chapter by Khan and Blankenburg, the political economy of 
(successful) industrialization entails the compatibility of technological and organizational strategies 
with the political constraints arising from the distribution of power among social groups (and often 
also from external influences, including of course foreign economic and political entities).  In this 
respect, the sad paradox of the political economy of development is that those supposedly in charge 
of leading the development strategies are the very groups which have huge vested interests in it and 
huge  rents  from  the  status  quo.    Hence  the  need  to  engineer  what  the  authors  call  systems  of 
institutional  compulsion  lending  momentum  to  imitation,  productivity  growth,  production 
expansion  and  eventually  innovation.    In  turn,  this  involves  the  political  ability  to  directly  or 
indirectly  allocate  developmental  rents  to  the  actors  of  the  ‘great  transformation’  (and  also 
withdraw them according to performances).  This is in fact what has happened in many Far Eastern 
countries, but not in most Latin American ones.  And the comparison also vividly illustrates the 
circumstances under which unleashing the rent-seeking genie of capitalism has unleashed also the 
‘Unbound Prometheus’ of technological advances as distinguished from those other circumstances 
whereby it just triggered the search for rents full stop. 
Stick-and-carrot and rent governance issues emerge also at the more circumscribed domain 
of market regulation and competition policies, addressed in the chapter by Possas and Borges.  The 
framework is broadly speaking ‘Schumpeterian’, in that the virtue of competition policies is judged 
against the yardstick of the performance dynamism that a particular market structure fosters, rather 
                                                 
3 In fact, another task force of the IPD is currently preparing a report on the subject. 
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than in terms of the standard textbook triangles of static allocation and welfare measures.  At early 
stages  of  industrial  development,  infant  industry  considerations  militate  against  the  viability  of 
competition policies either as a rent-curbing stick or an innovation-enhancing carrot.  Thus, other 
institutional  devices  should  be  in  place  in  order  to  govern  ‘developmental  rents’  and  spur  the 
‘developmental compulsion’ discussed by Kahn and Blankenburg, including performance-related 
allocation of finance, foreign currency, subsidies, and diverse taxation regimes.  The first three 
decades of Korean industrialization are a good case to the point.  And older historical experiences 
reinforce it: competition policies have typically been introduced in all catching-up countries well 
after  the  initial  industrialization  drive  –  in  the  U.S.  as  well  as  in  Germany,  Italy  and  Japan.  
However,  Possas  and  Borges  argue  that  above  a  certain  threshold  of  development  competition 
policies become (or at least ought to become) an important ingredient of industrial policies, often 
under negligible trade offs between rent-curbing and incentives to innovate, if any. 
 
 
The consistency conditions among macro policies and industrial policies 
 
Industrial  policies,  in  the  broad  definition  adopted  here,  are  a  constant  presence  in  all 
historically  observed  successes  in  industrialization.    However,  they  require  compatible  macro 
policies, regarding exchange rates, taxation, fiscal policies, public investment, governance of the 
labor  market,  income  distribution.    This  is  another  crucial  facet  of  the  political  economy  of 
industrialization.  It is also a theme recurrent in several chapters, especially those analyzing the 
experience of single countries or comparing them (see in particular those by Castro, Kosakoff and 
Ramos, and Palma).  There is a more dramatic way to put the same point: there are combinations of 
macro policies which are bound to suffocate industrial development and sterilize most opportunities 
of success of more technology- and industry-oriented polices, even when tried.   The point is well 
illustrated by the application of the ‘Washington Consensus’ policy package in Latin America (with 
the partial exception of Brazil), with its devastating effects on industrial production capacity and 
technological capabilities – which often disappeared together with the firms that were carrying them 
(for some evidence cf. also the chapter by Castaldi et al.). 
This is even more striking, when the effects of Latin American macro shocks are compared 
with the outcomes at industrial level of much less orthodox responses to financial and exchange rate 
crises such as in Korea and other Far Eastern economies: we discuss them in Stiglitz (2002) and 
(2006). 
Certainly, the sudden liberalization process together with orthodox macro policies in Latin 
America, had a massive ‘weeding out’ effect.  However, there is no guarantee – either in biology or 
even less so in economics – that a major selection shock allows anyone specie to survive.  And in 
fact what happened in South America (outside Brazil) was that in the aftermath of the shock one 
found  piles  of  rubbles  where  before  one  had  a  variegate,  even  if  often  inefficient,  industrial 
structure, with few survivors - except in some natural-resource based activities (these activities are 
currently experiencing a boom driven by the spectacular increase in demand of energy and raw 
material especially by China, but a big question-mark remains concerning their ability to lead the 
industrialization of whole countries: we shall come back to the issue in the conclusions). 
 
 
How much are the lessons from the past helpful for the future? 
 
In our view there is little doubt on the historical lessons pointing out the crucial importance 
of various ensembles of industrial policies and institution-building efforts in nurturing capabilities 
accumulation and industrial development.   Indeed, the chapters which follow add several original 
insights to such evidence.  However, even granted that, the last resort of the skeptic rests in the view 
that even what applied to the past will not apply to the future: the magic that was not done by the   11 
Washington Consensus  policy medicines is  going to come around nonetheless as a natural by-
product of ‘globalization’.  In order to address this conjecture, in the chapter by Castaldi et al., we 
set the current trends against a secular background evidence on the international distribution of 
innovative activities, the patters of technological diffusion, the structure of international trade flows 
and income growth.  One major message of the analysis is that divergence and heterogeneity have 
been and continue to be the dominant tendencies in the world economy.  Second, and relatedly, 
notwithstanding the hype, there appears to be a lot of globalization of (short term) finance, but 
relatively little, if any, in terms of technological capabilities.  In fact it could well be that under 
conditions of dynamic increasing returns, more international openness of capital and trade flows 
might well ‘naturally’ induce divergence across regions and countries.  Hence, in our view also the 
continuing importance of measures of discretionary policy intervention able to trigger and fuel what 
we have called the ‘great industrial transformation’.   
  Clearly, the international conditions have changed compared to when, say, the United States 
were moving their first steps toward catching-up, and even compared to when Korea or Taiwan 
were entering the international scene.  The WTO and the TRIPS agreements are putting some novel 
constraints on what policies can and cannot do with respect to both their domestic industry and to 
trade  flows.    First-world  companies  are  as  aggressive  as  ever  before  in  the  defense  of  their 
proprietary technologies.  The very emergence of China as a major industrial player has profoundly 
changed the patterns of opportunities and constraints facing other actual or would-be industrializers.  
All true.  But the processes of knowledge accumulation and industrial development continue to 
require relative massive doses of public policies and institution-building molding a national political 
economy friendly to technological and organizational learning. 
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